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http://asp.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/56RESEARCH Open AccessDistributed beamforming designs to improve
physical layer security in wireless relay networks
Mujun Qian1, Chen Liu1* and Youhua Fu1,2Abstract
This paper investigates security-oriented beamforming designs in a relay network composed of a source-destination
pair, multiple relays, and a passive eavesdropper. Unlike most of the earlier works, we assume that only statistical
information of the relay-eavesdropper channels is known to the relays. We propose beamforming solutions for
amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) relay networks to improve secrecy capacity. In an AF
network, the beamforming design is obtained by approximating a product of two correlated Rayleigh quotients to
a single Rayleigh quotient using the Taylor series expansion. Our study reveals that in an AF network, the secrecy
capacity does not always grow as the eavesdropper moves away from the relays or as total relay transmit power
increases. Moreover, if the destination is nearer to the relays than the eavesdropper is, a suboptimal power is
derived in closed form through monotonicity analysis of secrecy capacity. While in a DF network, secrecy capacity
is a single Rayleigh quotient problem which can be easily solved. We also found that if the relay-eavesdropper
distances are about the same, it is unnecessary to consider the eavesdropper in a DF network. Numerical results
show that for either AF or DF relaying protocol, the proposed beamforming scheme provides higher secrecy
capacity than traditional approaches.
Keywords: Physical layer security; Wireless relay networks; Cooperative beamforming; Amplify-and-forward;
Decode-and-forward; Secrecy capacity1. Introduction
Cooperative communications, in which multiple nodes help
each other transmit messages, has been widely acknowl-
edged as an effective way to improve system performance
[1-3]. However, due to the broadcast property of radio
transmission, wireless communication is vulnerable to
eavesdropping which consequently makes security schemes
of great importance as a promising approach to communi-
cate confidential messages.
The traditional secure communication schemes rely on
encryption techniques where secret keys are used. However,
as the high-layer secure protocols have attracted growing
attacks in recent years, the implementation of security
schemes at physical layer becomes a hotspot. It was first
proved by Wyner that it is possible to communicate per-
fectly at a non-zero rate without a secret key if the eaves-
dropper has a worse channel than the destination [4]. This* Correspondence: liuch@njupt.edu.cn
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in any medium, provided the original work is pwork was extended to Gaussian channels in [5] and to fad-
ing channels in [6]. Recently, there has been considerable
work on secure communication in wireless relay networks
(WRNs) [7-15]. A widely acknowledged measurement of
system security in WRNs is the maximal rate of secret in-
formation exchange between source and destination which
is defined as secrecy capacity. A decode-and-forward (DF)-
based cooperative beamforming scheme which completely
nulls out source signal at eavesdropper(s) was proposed in
[7], and this work was extended to the amplify-and-forward
(AF) protocol and cooperative jamming in [8]. Hybrid
beamforming and jamming was investigated in [9] where
one relay was selected to cooperate and the other to make
intentional interference in a DF network. Combined relay
selection and cooperative beamforming schemes for DF
networks were proposed in [10] where two best relays were
selected to cooperate. The authors of [11,12] considered
the scenario where the relay(s) could not be trusted in co-
operative MIMO networks. Additionally, a new metric of
system security is brought up in [13] as intercept probabil-
ity and optimal relay selection schemes for AF and DFOpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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ity were proposed.
In earlier works, it is widely assumed that the relays have
access to instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of
relay-eavesdropper (RE) channels [7,8,13-15]. This assump-
tion is ideal but unpractical in a real-life wiretap attack
since the malicious eavesdropper would not be willing to
share its instantaneous CSI. Thus, security schemes using
instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper cannot be adopted
anymore. However, the instantaneous CSI of relay-
destination (RD) channels is available since the destination
is positive. The statistical information of the RE channels is
also available through long-term supervision of the eaves-
dropper's transmission [9]. It is worth mentioning that even
if the relays do not have access to the perfect CSI of RD
channels, they can still estimate these channels by training
sequences and perform beamforming based on the esti-
mated CSI [16].
Our focus is on secrecy capacity, and we are interested
in maximizing it with appropriate weight designs of re-
lays. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces system model under AF and DF proto-
cols using relay beamforming. The optimization problem in
an AF network is addressed and solved in Section 3 along
with some analyses of secrecy capacity. Section 4 provides
the optimal beamforming design for a DF network along
with a surprising finding that considering the eavesdropper
sometimes may not be necessary. Numerical results are
given in Section 5 to compare the performances of different
designs, and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.2. System model
Consider a cooperative wireless network consisting of a
source node S, a legitimate destination D, an eavesdropper
E, and M relays Ri, i = 1,…, M as shown in Figure 1. Each
node is equipped with single antenna working in half-
duplex mode. Assume that there is no direct link between
the source and the destination/eavesdropper, i.e., neither
the destination nor the eavesdropper is in the coverage area
of the source. For notational convenience, we denote the
source-relay (SR) channels as fi, the RD channels as gi, and
the RE channels as hi. All the channels are modeled as in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading
channels, i.e., f ieCN 0; σ2f i  , gieCN 0; σ2gi  , and hieCN
0; σ2hi
 
. Considering the path loss effect and setting the
path loss exponent to 4 (for an urban environment), we





¼ d−4RiD , and σ2hi ¼ d−4RiE , where dAB is
the distance between nodes A and B. We assume the relays
to know instantaneous CSI of SR channels and RD chan-
nels, but only statistical information of RE channels. With-
out loss of generality, we also assume the additive noises to
be i.i.d. and follow a CN 0; 1ð Þ distribution.2.1 Amplify-and-forward





first hop where the information symbol s is selected
from a codebook and is normalized as E|s|2 = 1, and Ps
is the transmit power. The received signal at Ri is





where vi is the additive noise at Ri.
In the second hop, each relay forwards a weighted ver-
sion of the noisy signal it just received. More specifically,
Ri normalizes ri with a scaling factor ρi ¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ f ij j2Ps
q
and then transmits a weighted signal ti =wiρiri. The trans-
mit power of Ri is Pi = |wi|










wTρfg sþ wTdiag ρg
n o
v þ vD ð2Þ
where w = (w1,…,wM)
T, ρfg = (ρ1f1g1,…, ρMfMgM)
T, ρg =
(ρ1g1,…, ρMgM)
T, v = (v1,…, vM)
T, and vD represents addi-
tive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the destination.
The total relay transmit power is wHw = P.









wTρfhsþ wTdiag ρhf gv þ vE ð3Þ
where ρfh = (ρ1f1h1,…, ρMfMhM)
T, ρh = (ρ1h1,…, ρMhM)
T,
and vE represents AWGN at the eavesdropper.
2.2 Decode-and-forward
In a DF protocol, the first hop is the same as in an AF
protocol. While in the second hop, instead of simply
amplifying the received signal, Ri decodes the message s
and multiplies it with a weighted factor wi to generate
the transmit signal ti =wis. The transmit power of Ri is
still Pi = |wi|
2. The received signals at the destination









hiti þ vE ¼ wThsþ vE ð5Þ
where g = (g1,…, gM)
T and h = (h1,…, hM)
T.
Figure 1 A cooperative wireless network model in the presence of an eavesdropper.
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In the following sections, we consider the security issue
of the above relay network. The metric of interest is se-
crecy capacity which is defined as
CS ¼ max CD−CE; 0f g ð6Þ
where CD ¼ 12 log2 1þ γDð Þ , CE ¼ 12 log2 1þ γEð Þ , and γD
and γE are received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively. We aim to
improve CS by exploiting appropriate beamforming de-
signs. The following subsection describes the proposed
beamforming design for an AF network.
3.1 Proposed design for AF (P-AF)
In distributed beamforming schemes, the relays compute
the received SNRs at the destination and the eavesdrop-



















































2), Γfh ¼ diag ρ12jð f 1j2
σ2h1 ;…; ρM




Now we discuss how to design w to maximize CS, and the
proposed solution is denoted by wAFp . It is obvious that
maximizing CS is equivalent to maximizing
1þγD
1þγE . Hence,
in what follows, the objective function will be 1þγD1þγE .
Substituting Equations 7 and 8 into 1þγD1þγE , we have











H þ Γg þ P−1I
 
w




wH Γh þ P−1I
 
w




where Dh ¼ diag σ2h1 ;…; σ2hM
n o
. This is a product of two
correlated Rayleigh quotients [17] which is generally dif-
ficult to maximize. However, it would be much easier to
 
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ive function to a single Rayleigh quotient.
Rewrite the optimization problem as




fg þ Γg þ P−1I
 
w
wH DhþP−1Ið Þw⋅wH ΓgþP−1Ið Þw
wH ΓhþP−1Ið Þw
: ð10Þ
Denote the matrices Dh + P
− 1I, Γg + P
− 1I, and Γh + P
− 1I
as A, B, and C, respectively. For simplicity, we also let
ai, bi, and ci represent the ith diagonal entry of A, B,
and C, respectively, and define p = (P1,…, PM)
T.
Since Pi = |wi|
2, the denominator can be rewritten as









ciPi . According to the Taylor


















if we expand f(p) at p0 ¼ PM ;…; PM
 
. Since




















































Pi þ K where K ¼ PM tr Að Þ tr Bð Þtr Cð Þ − tr ABC−1
  
.
It can be proved that K is negligible either with small P or
large P if we make a commonly used assumption that the
SR distances are about the same (see Appendix for details).






Pi ¼ wHABC−1w ð13Þ
So the optimization problem in (9) can be appro-




fg þ Γg þ P−1I w
wHABC−1w
ð14Þ
This is a single Rayleigh quotient problem. It has been
reported in [17] that if U is Hermitian and V is positive








−1U) is the lar-
gest eigenvalue of V−1U. The equality holds if x = cumax
(V−1U) where c can be any non-zero constant and umax
(V−1U) is the unit-norm eigenvector of V−1U corre-
sponding to λmax(V
−1U). As a result, the optimal solu-





uλmax Φð Þ ð15Þ
where Φ =A− 1B− 1C(Psρfgρfg
H + Γg + P
− 1I).
To show the agreement of the approximated denomin-
ator and the exact denominator, we calculated them nu-
merically, and the results are shown in Figure 2. The
channel information we used are listed in Table 1 where
f = (f1,…, fM)
T, g = (g1,…, gM)
T, and σh ¼ σ2h1 ;…; σ2hM
 T
.
f and g are generated randomly.
For comparison purpose, we present two other beam-
forming designs. First, for the optimization of a product
of two correlated Rayleigh quotient problems, a method
was proposed recently in [8] to maximize the upper and
lower bounds. Note that ηmin≤
wH ΓhþP−1Ið Þw


















fg þ Γg þ P−1I
 
w










fg þ Γg þ P−1I
 
w











umax Dh þ P−1I
 −1
Psρfgρfg




We also address the traditional design for AF (T-AF)
where the eavesdropper is ignored and the goal is to
maximize CD. It can be easily proved that the optimal




constant chosen to satisfy wAFt
 H
wAFt ¼ P.
Figure 2 Comparison of the approximated denominator and the exact denominator.
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It is natural to conjecture that secrecy capacity would
grow as the eavesdropper moved away or as the total
relay transmit power increased. However, we find that
this conjecture is not always right.
For simplicity, we assume the distances between relays
are much smaller than those between the relays and the
source, so the path losses of the SR channels are almost the
same. The same assumption is also made to the destin-
ation/eavesdropper. Denote the SR, RD, and RE distances
as dSR, dRD, and dRE, respectively, and the corresponding
channel variances as σ2f , σ
2
g , and σ
2
h, respectively.
Proposition 1. If the destination is much nearer to the
relays than the eavesdropper is in an AF network, CS
does not always grow as the total relay transmit power
increases, and a suboptimal value of the total relay





















is bounded asλmin Φð Þ≤
wH Psρfgρ
H






Due to the difficulty of calculating the eigenvalues of
Φ, we replace the non-diagonal elements in Φ with
their mean value 0 and the ith diagonal element
ρ2i σ
2
hPþ1ð Þ gij j2Pþ1
 
σ2hPþ1ð Þ ρ2i gij j2Pþ1
  with λ Pð Þ ¼ ρ2σ2hPþ1ð Þ σ2g Pþ1ð Þ
σ2hPþ1ð Þ ρ2σ2g Pþ1ð Þ where
ρ2 ¼ 11þσ2f Ps. Thus, Φ becomes λ(P)I after replacement.
Define CS Pð Þ ¼ 12 log2λ Pð Þ . Now we investigate the
monotonicity of CS(P). The first-order derivatives of CS
(P) and λ(P) can be computed, respectively, as





λ Pð Þ ð20Þ
and










 2 : ð21Þ
By setting C′S Pð Þ ¼ 0, we obtain the positive stationary
point of CS(P) as described in (18).
If dRE >dRD (σ2h < σ
2
g ), ∀P∈(0, Psubopt), we have C
′
S Pð Þ > 0;
∀P∈(Psubopt, + ∞), we have C′S Pð Þ < 0 . Hence, if the
Table 1 Channel coefficients used in Figure 2
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an increasing function over (0, Psubopt) and a decreasing func-
tion over (Psubopt, + ∞), which means that CS(Psubopt) is the
maximum of CS(P).
This monotonicity of CS and the accuracy of Psubopt
under the case of dRE > dRD will be verified in the next
section. It needs to be pointed out that the above ana-
lysis is not for any certain design, so the optimal value of
P for a certain design would be different from but
around Psubopt. It also needs to be pointed out that the
replacement of the channel coefficients in Φ with their
mean values may result in the loss of the security benefit
that is supposed to be achieved by exploiting the perfect
CSI of SR and RD channels. This loss does not affect the
monotonicity of CS greatly under the case of dRE > dRD
because the destination is much nearer and therefore
much more advantageous in communication than the
eavesdropper is. However, when dRE < dRD (or dRE =
dRD), such replacement becomes inappropriate, since the
instantaneous CSI of fi and gi improves the system se-
curity significantly.
We can further compute the second-order derivatives
of CS(P) and λ(P), respectively, as




λ″ Pð Þλ Pð Þ− λ′ Pð Þ 2
λ2 Pð Þ ð22Þ
and












It can be observed from (22) that the positivity of C″S
Pð Þ depends on the value of P. Thus, CS(P) is neither
convex nor concave.
Remark 1. In an AF network, if the total relay transmit
power is large, the AWGNs in the second hop are negli-
gible compared to the forwarded versions of the
AWGNs in the first hop. Thus, 1þγD1þγE can be approxi-


















This equation does not involve σ2h , which implies CS is
a constant in this case wherever the eavesdropper is.
4. Distributed beamforming design for DF
This section focuses on the security-oriented beamform-
ing design for DF protocol. Similar to the design for AF
protocol, the mission is to find the optimal design under
a total relay transmit power constraint to maximize se-
crecy capacity.
4.1 Proposed design for DF (P-DF)
From Equations 4 and 5, the received SNRs at the des-


















Let wDFp be the optimal solution of the proposed de-
sign, then






wH Iþ PggHð Þw





umax Iþ PDhð Þ−1 Iþ PggH
  
: ð27Þ
For comparison purpose, we also address the traditional
design for DF (T-DF) and denote the solution by wDFt . The
optimization problem is formulated as wDFt ¼ arg
maxwHw¼P wHggHw, and the optimal solution is obviously




4.2 Discussion about secrecy capacity in DF networks
It is a natural thought that no matter under what chan-
nel assumption, secrecy capacity achieved by security-
Figure 3 Secrecy capacity versus total relay transmit power using P-AF design.
Figure 4 Secrecy capacity versus total relay transmit power using different AF designs.
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Figure 5 Secrecy capacity versus total relay transmit power using P-DF design.
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traditional designs. However, the fact is that these de-
signs may have the same performance which means that
sometimes we can just ignore the eavesdropper.
Remark 2. In a DF network, if the RE distances are
about the same (which is widely assumed), it is unneces-
sary to consider the eavesdropper as the security-oriented
design and the traditional design are indeed the same.
Noticing that in this scenario, we can write Dh as σ2hI.








¼ ﬃﬃﬃPp umax Iþ PggHð Þ. Since
Iþ PggH ⋅umax PggH  ¼ 1þ λmax PggH  ⋅umax PggH 






we have umax(I + Pgg
H) = umax(Pgg
H). Thus, wDFp ¼ cDFg
which is the same as wDFt .
5. Numerical results
In this section, we investigate the performance of the
above beamforming designs numerically. The simula-
tion environment follows the model of Section 2. We
perform Monte Carlo experiments consisting of 10,000
independent trials to obtain the average results.
Assume the number of relays is M = 6, and the
source transmit power is Ps = 10 dB. In order to show
the influence of the RE distance in AF protocol, we fix
the source at (0,0), the destination at (2,0), and the re-
lays at (1,0) and move the eavesdropper from (1.25,0)to (5,0). We assume that the distances between relays are
much smaller than SR/RD/RE distances. Therefore, the
SR channels and RD channels follow a CN 0; 1ð Þ distribu-
tion, and the RE distance dRE varies from 0.25 to 4.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between average se-
crecy capacity and total relay transmit power with the
eavesdropper in different locations using P-AF design.
We can see that if the eavesdropper is nearer to the re-
lays than the destination is, the relays should use the
maximal power to transmit. However, if the destination
is much nearer, there is an optimal value of total relay
transmit power which is about 12 dB under the case of
dRE = 2, while the theoretical value in (18) is 4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 10p ≈
11:23 dB which is not very accurate but close. The rea-
son is that Psubopt satisfies d 12 log2λ Pð Þ
 
=dP ¼ 0 while
the optimal power for P-AF design should satisfy d
1
2 log2λmax Φð Þ
 
=dP ¼ 0 . However, it is difficult to ex-
press λmax(Φ) in terms of the total relay transmit
power and the channel coefficients, not to mention to
solve the latter equation analytically. It can also be
seen that as the total relay transmit power increases,
the secrecy capacity tends to keep constant no matter
where the eavesdropper is.
Figure 4 compares different AF beamforming designs. It
can be seen that the B-AF design shows a slight advantage
over the T-AF design only when the total relay transmit
power is small in the dRE = 1/2 case, while our proposed
design always performs the best.
The relationship between average secrecy capacity
and total relay transmit power with the eavesdropper
Figure 6 Secrecy capacity versus total relay transmit power under different DF designs.
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strated in Figure 5. We still assume the RE distances to
be the same. Results show that the secrecy capacity of
a DF network grows as the total relay transmit power
increases or as the eavesdropper moves away.
To verify Remark 2, we now examine the P-DF design
and T-DF design under different variance assumptions
of the RE channels.
Case 1: σh ¼ 1 0 5 1 0:1 0:05 0:01ð ÞT
Case 2: σh ¼ 3 2 1 0:5 0:1 0:05ð ÞT
Case 3: σh ¼ 1:1 1:05 1 0:95 0:9 0:85ð ÞT
The average secrecy capacities of P-DF and T-DF de-
signs under different RE channel assumptions are dem-
onstrated in Figure 6. Our design outperforms the
traditional design in case 1 and case 2. While in case 3,
the two designs have the same performance. This indi-
cates that the greater the RE channels differ from each
other, the more superior the P-DF design is. If the RE




















In this paper, we focused on security-oriented distributed
beamforming designs for relay networks in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We provided two beamforming
designs under a total relay transmit power constraint, one
of which is for AF and the other is for DF. Each design is
to maximize secrecy capacity by exploiting information of
SR, RD, and RE channels. To derive the beamforming so-
lution for AF requires approximating the optimization ob-
jective by using the Taylor series expansion, while the
solution for DF is obtained much more easily. We also
found that secrecy capacity does not always grow if the re-
lays use more power to transmit or if the eavesdropper
gets farther from the relays, and that taking the eavesdrop-
per into consideration is not always necessary. Moreover,
for AF, we derived a suboptimal value of the total relay
transmit power if the destination is nearer than the eaves-
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with large P. If we make the assumption that the SR dis-
tances are all about the same, i.e., the σ2f i 's are about the
same (which is also assumed in [8]), and replace |fi|
2 in
the expression of ρ2i with its mean value σ
2

















Thus, K ≈ 0 with large P.
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